We show that Miller and Pazgal's (2001) model of strategic delegation, in which managerial incentives are based upon relative performance, is a¤ected by a non-existence problem which has impact on the price equilibrium. The undercutting incentives generating this result are indeed similar to those a¤ecting the stability of price cartels.
Introduction
By now, the issue of strategic delegation in oligopoly has received a large amount of attention, with several di¤erent types of contract having been taken into account. The main alternatives investigated in the literature examine managerial incentive schemes based on a weighted average of pro…ts and output (Vickers, 1985) ; pro…ts and revenues (Fershtman and Judd, 1985; Sklivas, 1987) ;
Comparative performance evaluation (Miller and Pazgal, 2001 ); pro…ts and market share (Jansen et al., 2007; Ritz, 2008 ).
Here we revisit the contribution by Miller and Pazgal (2001, henceforth MP) , who adopt a model of strategic delegation where managerial incentives rely upon relative performance. In this case, the delegation contract establishes that a manager's objective consists in maximising a weighted average of his own …rm's pro…ts and the rival's pro…ts w.r.t. the relevant market variable, either quantity or price. 1 They claim that in such a setup, and unlike the previous approaches to strategic delegation (cf. Vickers, 1985; and Fershtman and Judd, 1987, inter alia) an equivalence result holds. That is, if the managerial objective is constructed on a relative pro…t performance scheme, the choice between price and quantity becomes immaterial as the equilibrium outcome is the same regardless of the way competition takes place at the market stage. 1 The adoption of such objective function in a setup describing the interplay between managerial …rms can be thought of as a speci…c instance of a general class of problems in which the relative standing of peers'outcomes in ‡uences each agent's individual preference structure (see Maccheroni, Marinacci and Rustichini, 2011) .
We re-examine MP's analysis to single out a mistake in the derivation of the (alleged) subgame perfect equilibrium in the model where the market stage is played in the price space. In particular, MP have overlooked a problem with price competition with perfect substitutes that requires taking limits instead of solving FOCs. When taking this into account, there appears that price competition with comparative performance evaluation contracts amounts to building up an explicit cartel that (i) should be prosecuted according to antitrust laws; (ii) is unstable, as it is subject to unilateral deviations, and therefore (iii) is not an equilibrium outcome of the two-stage delegation game.
Our analysis is also motivated by an earlier paper on relative pro…t incentives; see Lundgren (1996) . The author argues that motivating managers to maximize relative pro…ts rather than absolute pro…ts will prevent collusion among the managers of di¤erent …rms. He states that "The key to understanding this method rests upon ... the observation that successful collusion increases absolute pro…ts of …rms, but does not increase the relative profits of …rms." (p. 534). Accordingly, …rms with relative pro…t motives have incentive to cheat or undercut the rival's price. 2 The cornerstone of our argument is the presence of an undercutting incentive that destroys the alleged candidate equilibrium for any degree of substitutability between goods. If substitutability is su¢ ciently high, price undercutting makes the deviating …rm a monopolist, very much like what happens in the Hotelling (1929) spatial competition model with linear disutility of transportation, where each …rm has an incentive to undercut the rival's price for su¢ ciently high degrees of substitutability between products, thereby undermining the existence of a Bertrand-Nash equilibrium in pure strategies due to insu¢ cient product di¤erentiation (cf. d 'Aspremont et al., 1979) . The presence of the undercutting incentive under price competition and relative performance compensation can be also explained with reference to another stream of literature that, at …rst sight, might seem unrelated to the issue of strategic delegation, which is the branch of the IO literature discussing the stability of implicit collusion with di¤erentiated products. The reason is that the adoption of delegation incentives based on relative pro…t performance mimics to some extent the behaviour of a cartel, as in both cases each …rm internalises the e¤ect of its own behaviour on the other …rm's pro…ts. From several contributions (cf. Deneckere, 1983; Ross, 1992 ; and Lambertini, 1997, inter alia), we know that if products are su¢ ciently similar, the unilateral deviation from implicit collusion in prices makes the cheating …rm a monopolist. The intuition behind the non-existence of the price equilibrium ultimately boils down to the idea that comparative performance evaluation boosts the aggressiveness of managers and lures the owners into exploiting such aggressiveness to steal the rival's customers (eventually all of them if product di¤erentiation is not large enough), in a destructive way.
Another way of looking at the same setup is to think of the same objective function as that of the owners, not the managers, in the case where the owner of …rm i buys a share of …rm j (and conversely), in such a way that each owner is entitled to enjoy part of the pro…ts generated by the other …rm. 3 With this in mind, it is immediate to conclude that the choice between price and quantity becomes immaterial, as the two …rms behave as a monopolist or a cartel, obviously indi¤erent between price-and quantity-setting. However, again the cartel is subject to unilateral deviations. Therefore, none of the alleged equilibria outlined by MP is indeed an equilibrium, as the delegation 3 A long-standing discussion on this point exists in the literature. See, e.g., Bishop 
Preliminaries: Miller-Pazgal' s linear model
The main focus of Miller and Pazgal's (2001) analysis is on a model of di¤er-entiated duopoly due to Bowley (1924) and then revived by Spence (1976) , Dixit (1979) and Singh and Vives (1984) .
The utility function of the representative consumer, characterised by a preference for variety, is (cf. Singh and Vives, 1984, p. 547):
where parameter 2 [ ; ] measures the degree of substitutability (in the positive range) or complementarity (in the negative range) between goods.
If instead = 0; the two …rms are independent monopolists on completely separated markets.
Inverse and direct market demand functions can be speci…ed as follows:
depending on whether Cournot or Bertrand competition is considered, and
The game has a standard two-stage structure, with owners playing simultaneously at the …rst stage in the space of delegation incentives ( i ; j ) ;
and managers playing simultaneously either in quantities or in prices. The manager of …rm i maximises
w.r.t. either q i or p i ; and receives a remuneration 
admitting a set of asymmetric parameters. However, while assuming di¤erent i 's and i 's is indeed admissible, the same does not apply for ; as the latter parameter measures the taste for variety in the representative consumer's mind, as from (1) . For more on these aspects of the model, see Singh and Vives (1984, pp. 547-48). 5 Note that A i and B i need not be simultaneously positive, as long as the manager's participation constraint is satis…ed. For instance, A i could be negative, as it would happen in the case of a franchise fee.
The MP game
Here a brief summary of the MP game. Both …rms'managers are choosing simultaneously the output or price levels. consider …rst the Cournot case.
Proceeding by backward induction, one has to solve the Cournot-Nash game between managers and then fold the game back towards the …rst stage to characterise optimal incentives. For the sake of brevity, we skip the computational details and list the expressions of the equilibrium variables and objective functions (superscript C standing for Cournot):
The Bertrand equilibrium (according to MP) looks exactly the same in terms of optimal output, price and pro…ts i.e., q
with m B > m C 8 2 (0; ] and conversely in the negative range. In the remainder, for simplicity and without further loss of generality, we focus on the case where = 1:
At this point, three observations can be put forward:
with
so that, while C indeed allows for an interpretation of the setup in terms of comparative performance, the functional form of B indeed drives in the opposite direction, as delegation under Bertrand competition takes the form of an increasing degree of collusion as products become less di¤erentiated.
2) Now, taking for granted that C and B are correct, one should see monopoly pricing under Bertrand competition, in correspondence of = 1 given that B = 1 with homogeneous goods, entailing that …rms are fully colluding. However, from (5) we have
which is lower than monopoly price p M = ( + c) =2 for all > c.
3) Conversely, under Bertrand behaviour one would expect to observe marginal cost pricing in correspondence of = 1 since …rms set prices -at least in principle, in a fully non cooperative way -with homogeneous products. While in VFJS price competition with perfect substitutes collapses onto marginal cost pricing, here, seemingly, it doesn't.
First order conditions and limit properties
To understand the mechanics of the model, one has to delve into the details of the managers'behaviour in the price stage. The relevant …rst order condition at the market stage of the Bertrand game is:
yielding
Plugging the price pair (11) into …rm i's pro…t function, the latter becomes:
while output is
According to MP, i must be maximised w.r.t. i ;
The resulting quantity, price, pro…ts and managerial objective function should be as in (5) .
This is where we start illustrating our objections to MP's claims. Our observations can be succinctly listed as follows:
Remark 1: Take j = i = (not necessarily MP's B ; but any symmetric ). From (12) , note that i = 0 for = 1. Therefore, one should expect marginal cost pricing to arise if …rms supply perfect substitutes.
However, assuming i = j yields
which takes the indeterminate 0=0 form taking into account that B ! 1 as ! 1. Applying the rule of de l'Hospital twice shows that the pro…t expression converges towards monopoly pro…t M = (a c) 2 =8.
Remark 2: Again, set j = i = , to simplify (11) as follows:
Now note that assuming …xed implies that p = c if = 1. On the other hand, taking into account that B ! 1 as ! 1, then expression (15) becomes indeterminate (taking a 0=0 form). Applying de l'Hospital rule yields
and hence convergence towards the monopoly price p M = ( + c) =2 at = 1.
Remark 3:
Alternatively, for any pair of i and j , we have
This reveals the problematic nature of Bertrand behaviour in the MP setup with homogeneous goods: in the neighbourhood of = 1; the limit behaviour of the Bertrand setup is sensitive to the order according to which one evaluates the limits of the endogenous variables. The ultimate implication seems to be that symmetric incentive schemes point towards monopoly pricing, but the latter is unstable and ultimately collapses to the Bertrand paradox. This raises the issue of undercutting incentives, to which we will come back extensively in the remainder.
Remark 4: Examine the FOC on (12) as in MP:
Now set j = i and rewrite the FOC as follows
and observe that the MP candidate solution, B = = (2 ) comes from (2 ) = 0. However, with = B , the expression on the r.h.s. of the above FOC is indeterminate in correspondence of = 1;
since also the denominator is nil. The same applies to quantities, prices and pro…ts because of the presence of the expression
at the denominator, in all of them.
Accordingly, one has to impose j = i and then resort to the limit for ! 1 in order to obtain the monopoly price, which, in turn, is obviously subject to undercutting. Therefore, we may state:
Proposition 1 With perfect substitutes, Bertrand competition cannot sustain equilibrium prices above marginal cost. As a result, the outcomes yielded by delegation contracts based on comparative performance evaluation are not observationally equivalent irrespective of the market variables being set by managers.
Without further discussion, it is worth noting that the same trivially holds in the mixed case in which a single …rm is a price-setter while the other is a quantity setter, where marginal cost pricing emerges in correspondence of full substitutability with pure pro…t-seeking (entrepreneurial) …rms (see Singh and Vives, 1984 ).
Product di¤erentiation and undercutting incentives
The next question is whether the same conclusion applies also when there exists some degree of di¤erentiation. In this respect, our analysis replicates quite closely that of (i) d 'Aspremont et al. (1979) concerning the original version of the Hotelling game, as well as (ii) Deneckere (1983) , Ross (1992) and many others, concerning deviations from cartel prices in supergames based on the Singh and Vives (1984) framework.
The question we are about to address can be formulated in two alternative ways:
(i) for 2 (0; 1] ; and given
so that (11) rewrites as
is there an undercutting price p 
reduces to
which is satis…ed by any admissible value of B i : 
whereby the undercutting pro…ts are
Being and con…ned to the unit interval, the above expression is positive for all
with e < B for all 2 (2=3; 1] : It can be easily checked that
and consequently 6 The coe¢ cient (1 2B i ) appearing on the r.h.s. of inequality (26) In this parameter region,
does not identify a subgame perfect equilibrium in pure strategies.
The above discussion applies for all values of and such that deviations give rise to monopoly. Suppose instead this is not the case, so that the cheated …rm is not driven out of business. This happens whenever the price resulting from
is such that the cheated …rm's output is positive, i.e.,
which, again considering that and are con…ned in the unit interval, holds for all < 2= [ (2 + )] ; with
and conversely outside this region. The resulting deviation pro…ts are:
which is always positive in the admissible parameter range. Accordingly, we have:
Lemma 3 Suppose i = j = and consider the case where undercutting the rival's price does not grant monopoly power to the deviator. In such a range, price undercutting is always pro…table.
Given that there exists a managerial remuneration scheme in correspondence of which a unilateral price deviation is desirable from the owner's and the manager's standpoint alike, in correspondence of a continuum of values of . Consequently, Lemmata 2-3 imply:
Proposition 4 Due to the presence of an undercutting incentive at the price stage, the subgame perfect equilibrium in pure strategies fails to exists for symmetric delegation contracts i = j = :
Given these strategies, we investigate whether, for a generic i there exists any price interval for p i such that i > B = C : The expression for i is: 
It is then easy to verify that p u i is the midpoint of the interval appearing in (39). The corresponding undercutting pro…ts amount to:
which immediately implies that undercutting is always pro…table, even in the complementarity range.
Yet, with j = B ; p i = p u i ; p j = p B and a generic level of i , the …rms' outputs are:
with q i > 0 for all 0 s, while q j > 0 for all < b = 0:881: Hence, for all 2 (b ; 1], one has to solve q j = 0 to …nd the relevant deviation price:
and again belonging to the interval (39). The corresponding undercutting pro…ts are:
Obviously, (40) and (43) coincide at = b : The foregoing discussion proves:
and for any i , the price that maximises …rm i's pro…ts is
with p u i < p B over the entire parameter range.
This second approach can also be interpreted in a di¤erent way. That is, we may ask ourselves whether the owner and manager of the deviating …rm may indeed collude to design the optimal deviation against the rival, that is setting the candidate equilibrium contract and price. This requires …nding out whether there exists a value of the delegation variable, call it u i ; such that, given (i) the pricing rule of …rm i's managers p i = p i as in (11) 
to obtain
which holds for all 0 < < b = 0:881: Within such a range of substitutability, by using u i the owner of …rm i can attain the undercutting pro…ts even if his manager is using the pricing rule that solves the relevant …rst order condition at the second stage of the game.
To perform the same exercise in the remainder of the substitutability range, where 2 (b ; 1] ; one has to proceed as in collusion models (see Deneckere, 1983 , and Lambertini, 1997, inter alia). The quantity of …rm j,
whereby …rm i's manager sets p i (
satisfying the …rst order condition and yet coinciding with (43).
The above analysis entails the following:
Lemma 6 Take p i = p i ; p j = p B ; and j = B : For all levels of product substitutability, the owner of …rm i will …nd it convenient to manoeuvre the incentive scheme of his own manager so as to induce the manager to mimic a price undercutting. The related managerial incentives are: We have focussed on Bertrand competition, where this issue strikingly arises, but analogous considerations apply to the mixed case where at least one …rm is a price-setting agent. 7 As anticipated above, an undercutting incentive also exists if one …rm sets price, whereas the other …rm sets quantity. We omit the analysis of this case for brevity.
